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Bibliopolitics: The History of Notation  
and the Birth of the Citational Academic Subject  
MATTHEW SHARPE & KIRK TURNER 
Deakin University, Australia 
ABSTRACT. The paper builds upon a growing body of critical research on the proliferating use 
of bibliometrics as a means to evaluate academic research, but brings to it a specifically Fou-
cauldian, genealogical approach. The paper has three parts. Part 1 situates bibliometrics as a new 
technology of neoliberal, biopolitical governmentality, alongside the host of other ‘metrics’ (led 
by biometrics) that have emerged in the last two decades. Part 2 analyses bibliometrics’ anteced-
ents in prior notational practices in the Western heritage, highlighting how forms of noting have 
almost always had political valences tied to projects of control or subversion. Part 3 then deline-
ates the specific features of bibliometrics as a new form of notation, highlighting the latest forms 
of academic subjectivity bibliometrics suppose and increasingly are summoning into being. 
Keywords: Bibliometrics, neoliberalism, biopower, notation, metric power. 
 
Bibliometrics, to all appearances the most innocuous of innovations, is “the application 
of mathematics and statistical methods to books and other media of communication.”1 
One might not think that this new technology could move worlds, or reshape entire re-
gimes of academic practice. The commensurating premise that enables the mathematics 
to happen is that a citation of some chapter, article or book, any citation, represents an 
‘endorsement’ of that text. Thus, “[t]he importance of an idea is measured by the num-
ber of citations received by the document(s) in which it is embedded.”2 This premise 
given, the ‘prestige’ or ‘quality’ of an article in any discipline whatsoever can be calcu-
lated, and ranked against all others, according to the number of citation-endorsements 
                                                        
1 Alan Pritchard, “Statistical Bibliography or Bibliometrics,” Journal of Documentation 25:4 (1969), 348. 
2 Christine L. Borgman, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Scholarly Communications and Bibliometrics, ed. Christine 
L. Borgman (1990), 19. 
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and (in more recent measures) the prestige of the journals in which the ‘donor-citations’ 
are found.  
The spread of this bibliometrical technology has been remarkable. Whereas the Sci-
ence Citation Index began publication in 1961,3 it was only with the advent of the inter-
net after 1998 that bibliometrics came of age.4 Automatic web-enabled citation indexing 
was introduced in 1998 with CiteSeer, followed soon afterwards by Google Scholar. The-
se pioneers have been followed by a host of competing citation-counting web-platforms 
like SCImago, each enabled by automatic algorithmic extraction and grouping of cita-
tions from millions of digitalised documents.5 In 2003, the Shanghai Academic Ranking of 
World Universities (ARWU) was born, assigning 20% of a university’s putative value to 
quality of research, measured using the Science Citation Index Expanded and Social Sci-
ence Citation Index to rank the research productions of its staff. In 2004, the QS World 
University Rankings began to use citations data, collected over five-year periods, from 
Thomson (since 2007 they have applied Scopus, owned by internet publishing giant, 
Elsevier), likewise to assign 20% of total university scores. Since 2010, the Times Higher 
Education World University Rankings has assigned some 32.5% of a university’s score to 
citation metrics, this time drawn from Thomson Reuters Web of Science. 
The rapid proliferation of bibliometrics, then, is far from being as null as its apparent-
ly seamless acceptance into academics’ lifeworlds might make it seem. By way of these 
global university rankings, bibliometrics have fast assumed a prominent place in how 
tertiary institutions are evaluated, governed, staffed and marketed.6 Whether academics 
like it or not – and however great the disparity between this new numerical dispensation 
and older intellectual norms surely is – scholars and their written productions are today 
compared, counted, rated and ranked by these new technologies in ways almost unim-
aginable even 25 years ago. Bibliometrical citation counts, as Audrey Baneyx notes, are 
“considered in grants, hiring, and tenure decisions by laboratories, institutions, and 
governments. For many reasons, researchers may want to demonstrate the impact of 
their work, and citation analysis is one, albeit controversial, way of doing so.”7 
There is a growing critical literature that has emerged in the wake of the rise and rise 
of bibliometrics. Scholars have questioned the manifold, tendentious assumptions that 
                                                        
3 See, for the evolution of citation indexing, Robert Hauptman, Documentation: A History and Critique of At-
tribution, Commentary, Glosses, Marginalia, Notes, Bibliographies, Works-Cited Lists, and Citation Indexing and 
Analysis (2008), 189–191. 
4 On this history, see Roger Burrows, “Living with the H-Index,” The Sociological Review 60:2 (2012), 358–
361. 
5 See ibid., 358–359, on what Burrows calls “the moment of the metrics,” which he dates (focusing on the 
United Kingdom) as somewhere between 1996 and 2001 based on Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs). 
6 See esp., William Locke, “The Institutionalization of Rankings: Managing Status Anxiety in an Increasing-
ly Marketized Environment,” in University Rankings: Theoretical Basis, Methodology and Impacts on Global 
Higher Education, eds. Jung C. Shin, Robert K. Toutkoushian and Ulrich Teichler (2011); “Living with the H-
Index,” 367–368; and, for a particular national case study, William Y.W. Lo, University Rankings: Implications 
for Higher Education in Taiwan (2014). 
7 Audrey Baneyx, “’Publish or Perish’ as Citation Metrics Used to Analyze Scientific Output in the Hu-
manities: International Case Studies in Economics, Geography, Social Sciences, Philosophy, and History,” 
Archivum Immunologiae et Therapiae Experimentalis 56:6 (2008), 369. 
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underlie the commensurating premises of bibliometrical citation counting: amongst 
them, that journals, which have migrated more rapidly online, are necessarily superior 
venues for academic publications than books or chapters; that all disciplines (arts, sci-
ences, business, medicine…) could or should have the same citational cultures; that 
peer-reviewed publication ‘in top journals’ is the only or most valuable aspect of what 
academics do; and that all citations, even highly critical ones, are effectively equal as 
putative tokens of esteem.8  
The following paper builds upon this research and the several international manifes-
toes that have appeared calling for critical caution and intelligent discretion in the use of 
these new bibliometric technologies. Nevertheless, it wants to bring to this literature a 
specifically Foucauldian approach and set of concerns. In what follows, we want to carry 
forwards the project that Michel Foucault described as writing “the history of the pre-
sent.” It will be a question of using the genealogical work of Foucault and thinkers in-
fluenced by him as the means to understand bibliometrics as a new technology of ne-
oliberal governmentality; grasping how its various features and ‘affordances’ differ from 
those of prior notational practices in the Western heritage; and delineating the new 
forms of academic subjectivity bibliometrics supposes and increasingly summons into 
being. 
The paper has three parts. In Part 1, we situate bibliometrics as a new technology for 
auditing and disciplining research conduct within two convergent histories. The first is 
the history of the biopolitical, quantitative technologies characterising forms of modern 
governmentality which culminate in today’s ‘metric explosion,’ as it might be termed. 
The second history is that of the more recent technologies for governing the unem-
ployed, deviant, and other recipients of public moneys that have emerged in ‘neoliberal’ 
or ‘advanced liberal’ regimes. In Part 2, we then situate the emergence of bibliometrics 
in light of the long and, as we will see, in fact always-highly-political history of Western 
note-taking in its different lineages, looking back to scribal marginalia and ancient forms 
of “self-writing.” As per Figure 1 below, Part 3 brings together the converging genealog-
ical work of the opening two parts. It analytically draws out the singular features of bib-
liometrics, in systematic comparison with the West’s previous forms of notation, their 
                                                        
8 For a small sample of this literature, see Baneyx, “‘Publish or Perish’”; Locke, “The Institutionalization of 
Rankings”; Colin Macilwain, “Halt the Avalanche of Performance Metrics,” Nature 500:7462 (14 August 
2013), 255; Diana Hicks, Paul Wouters, Ludo Waltman, Sarah de Rijcke and Ismael Rafols, “Bibliometrics: 
The Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics,” Nature 520:7548 (22 April 2015), 429–431; Julia Lane, “Let’s 
Make Science Metrics More Scientific,” Nature 464:1267 (25 March 2010), 488–489; Anne-Wil Harzing, “Cita-
tion Analysis Across Disciplines: The Impact of Different Data Sources and Citation Metrics,” Harzing.com: 
Research in International Management; Phil Jones, “Altmetrics and Research Assessment: How Not to Let 
History Repeat Itself,” The Scholarly Kitchen (1 September 2015); Maarten van Wesel, “Evaluation by Cita-
tion: Trends in Publication Behaviour, Evaluation Criteria, and the Striving for High Impact Publications,” 
Science and Engineering Ethics 22:1 (2016), 199–225; “Poor Citation Practices Are a Form of Academic Self-
Harm in the Humanities and Social Sciences,” Medium.com; Björn Brembs, Katherine Button and Marcus 
Munafò, “Deep Impact: Unintended Consequences of Journal Rank,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (24 
June 2013); Peter Weingart and Sabine Maasen, “Elite Though Rankings – The Emergence of the Enterpris-
ing University,” in The Changing Governance of the Sciences: The Advent of Research Evaluation Systems, eds. 
Richard Whitley and Jochen Gläser (2007), 75–99; “Living with the H-Index,” esp. 361–362. 
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subjects, objects, addressees, means and ends (Part 2), and in connection with its neolib-
eral credentials (Part 1). The greatest danger of these new, increasingly omniscient and 
omni-visible technologies, hitherto under-recognised in the literature, the argument 
would suggest, lies in how they shape forms of subjectivity increasingly unable to see 
‘outside’ and thus critique the avalanche of quantitative measures that are promising to 
tell scholars the truth about themselves and their work. 
 
Figure 1: The Argument Pictured: The Convergent Genealogies of Bibliometrics 
Part 1: Metric Power and Neoliberal Governmentality 
We are currently living in a highly advanced phase of tracking and extracting quantita-
tive data from myriad forms of human activity. Bibliometrics is only one manifestation 
of this wider phenomenon: what has been called “a culture of metrics and also a cultural 
metrics…both a cultural interest in numbers and culture that is shaped and populated 
with numbers.”9 With the development of increasingly sophisticated computer-based 
technologies, combined with the shrinking of digital storage spaces, a social conjuncture 
has emerged in which the coding of units of information – from website preferences to 
social media participation; from employment history to one’s tax situation – has on the 
one hand streamlined earlier, more cumbersome, lengthy or environmentally harmful 
practices of collecting and maintaining records. On the other hand, it has created an in-
creasingly complicated network of data storage, miners, owners and (third-party) sup-
pliers, as well as new forms of power and subjectivation: what David Beer has dubbed 
“metric power.”10 
At issue here is more than government-mandated information streams (e.g. census, 
social security or health-related data), or even the sneaky, contractually ‘agreed’ tracking 
enabled by the internet and mobile apps. With the advent of the digitalised iPhone in 
particular, subjects are now constantly providing data about themselves – down to their 
very movements, number of steps walked, calories consumed, etc. – whether knowingly 
                                                        
9 David Beer, Metric Power (2016), 145. 
10 I.e. the title of Beer, Metric Power. 
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or in a disavowed form (i.e., “I know fully well that others have access to this infor-
mation, but I don’t need to consider the full implications of this”).  
For instance, there is the provision of information about how our bodies are function-
ing: the province of “biometrics.” A team from Microsoft Research, in conjunction with 
MIT and SUNY, recently attempted to put the rise of self-tracking biometrical devices 
into historical perspective. Their study looks backwards to the weight scale of the late 
19th century, and forwards to the wristband or clip-on tracker of today.11 They note how 
there is indeed a long lineage of a “drive toward physical quantification and, specifical-
ly, a connection between external measurement and self-knowledge” which is peaking, 
rather than newly emerging today.12 The measurement of one’s weight, for instance, be-
came commonplace, beginning in doctor’s offices, around the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. The invention of the penny scale, available on the streets of major industrialised 
cities, gave general populations the opportunity to utilise the technology cheaply when-
ever they so desired. Then, a growing acceptance of the putative ‘necessity’ for heighten-
ing forms of self-knowledge heralded the home scale and, most recently, wearable digi-
tal devices like watches which promise a further leap forwards in the quantity and con-
venience of information available to subjects.  
Today’s biometrics indeed increasingly monitor the most intimate aspects of “human 
physiology and…behaviour such as voice recognition, gait, and signature analysis.”13 
Along with each of these technologies have come discourses positing new ideals of 
health and normalcy, hence new forms of sometimes obsessional self-management, and, 
lately, spiralling issues surrounding who has access to what information, for what ends. 
Indeed, as the authors state: “[t]he layers of obfuscation regarding how data are mined 
are accentuated when comparing the user experience of getting data from wearables 
versus a weight scale.”14  
Decisively, that is to say, while the user is receiving, ostensibly satisfied, their own 
individualised data stream back from the devices, the companies who own and operate 
the device systems collect and are privy to globalised demographic data unavailable to 
individuals. In David Beer’s words, the metrical data harvested from subjects through 
                                                        
11 Kate Crawford, Jessa Lingel and Tero Karppi, “Our Metrics, Ourselves: A Hundred Years of Selftracking 
from the Weight Scale to the Wrist Wearable Device,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 18:4/5 (2015), 479–
496. Their principal example is the FitBit, which measures such things as physical ability and number of 
calories burnt. 
12 Ibid., 480. 
13 Elia Zureik and Karen Hindle, “Governance, Security and Technology: The Case of Biometrics,” Studies in 
Political Economy 73:1 (2004), 116. 
14 Crawford, Lingel and Karppi, “Our Metrics, Ourselves,” 486. Today's health insurance companies have 
capitalised on these monitoring technologies, even offering them free to clients in directed campaigns, with 
a specific view to the reduction of preventable injuries and diseases – which means, for the insurers, a re-
duction in claims, referrals and cash payouts. Added to this, as Crawford, Lingel and Karppi duly note, is 
the fact that the “claims to accuracy and reliability of these devices are mythic” (ibid., 490). Not only are the 
technologies subject to numerous inaccuracies, malfunctions, and the like. The types of knowledge they 
present also need to be interpreted. In the absence of the kinds of specialised comprehension of physiologi-
cal processes specific to health professionals, the possible uses of this information, despite claims to the 
contrary, are at best largely subjective or at worst meaningless. 
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devices like the iPhone or Apple Watch, “have the scope to appear objective whilst limit-
ing the possibilities for participation and enabling certain power dynamics to thrive.”15 
When people start using these devices, they enter into a relationship with the digital 
providers that is inherently asymmetrical. They are providing more data than they re-
ceive, and they have little input as to the life of that data, where it is stored, whether it 
can be deleted, and with whom it is shared, for what ends.16 Crawford, Lingel and 
Karppi are thus right to conclude that the “idea of agency” in and around self-tracking 
devices “becomes deeply complicated” and imbricated in “complex entanglements of 
information, consent and privacy.”17 The boundaries of what could any longer be ‘pri-
vate’ are indeed increasingly rendered opaque. 
Weight-tracking technologies proffer merely a single example of the ways that met-
rics are increasingly omnipresent in our everyday lives, harnessing mechanisms of 
“identification, categorization (inclusion and exclusion), and…monitoring.”18 The pa-
tented increase in the use of these and related metrical and surveillance technologies is 
directly linked by several authors to the post-9/11 climate of fear.19 Sold as means to 
combat “terrorism, identity theft, and general personal insecurity,” these new technolo-
gies have increasingly, since 2001, generated concerns surrounding leaks of private in-
formation and national security risks.20 Yet this advent of ”metric power” should also be 
seen as one, the most recent, chapter in several much longer histories linking forms of 
human surveillance and quantification with what Foucault famously called “biopower” 
in the modern West. As we need not belabour here, biopolitics names for Foucault those 
modern forms of governing that emerged in the 17th and 18th centuries which for the first 
time “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made 
knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.”21 On the one hand, mod-
ern biopolitics calls upon the disciplines: forms of minute, exacting control over individ-
uals such as surveillance, exercise regimens, rankings and examinations.22 On the other 
hand, biopower from its 17th century inception “gave rise…to comprehensive measures, 
statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups 
taken as a whole.”23 As Pugliese concludes, contemporary metric technologies, from bi-
                                                        
15 Metric Power, 47. Here he is discussing Theodore M. Porter’s work on ‘the rise of statistical thinking’ but 
the thought applies to biometrics.  
16 “Our Metrics, Ourselves,” 493. 
17 Ibid., 494. 
18 Zureik and Hindle, “Governance, Security and Technology,” 114. 
19 Indeed, Zureik and Hindle note that the International Biometrics Industry Association sought to capital-
ise on the terrorist events a mere two weeks later, at a time when the “high-tech and dot-com industries 
were in a severe economic slump.” Ibid., 121. 
20 Ibid., 128. 
21 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 [1976] (1998), 143. 
22 On which, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison [1975] (1995). 
23 Famously, Foucault singles out “demography, the evaluation of the relationship between resources and 
inhabitants, the constructing of tables analysing wealth and its circulation” as the new 18th–19th century 
claimants to knowledge constructing a collective subject, the “population” (Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, 
140). For the first time, the aggregative powers of this new subject – tendencies to disease or health, rates of 
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ometrics to bibliometrics, are indeed “the culmination of a series of anthropometric 
technologies that can be genealogically traced back to…the historical emergence of bio-
politics.”24 
With that said, Beer’s Metric Power also duly prompts us to comprehend the rise of 
metrics and big data in the context of more recent, specifically neoliberal or ‘advanced 
liberal,’ biopolitical technologies.25 In one sense, as Beer suggests, the connection be-
tween liberal-capitalist social relations and the kind of quantitative measures for human 
conduct that metrics promise might seem direct and unchanging. Markets are competi-
tions and competitions must have winners and losers. In order for different parties to be 
so ranked, some common measure or ‘universal equivalent’ or ‘metric’ is required, start-
ing from money itself. Nevertheless, from Foucault’s analyses of the German Ordoliber-
als forwards,26 the Foucauldian approach to the nest of ideologemes and governmental 
strategies known as ‘neoliberalism’ fundamentally challenges the idea that this ‘ad-
vanced liberal’ governmentality is situated within a continuous, unbroken lineage look-
ing back from Thatcher, Reagan et al. to 18th century political economics and 19th century 
forms of the ‘night-watchman’ state.27 And understanding how neoliberalism breaks 
with its liberal predecessors also allows us to see the politico-economic causes behind 
today’s veritable explosion of forms of metrics, reaching from biometrics via bibliomet-
rics even into the sacred groves of academe. 
Adam Smith and classical liberals supposed that market exchange was natural and 
co-primordial with human societies. The best government was then the least govern-
ment. It is a matter of leaving the market free so human nature can unfold itself, in order 
to optimise welfare and productivity. Advanced or neoliberal governmentality, by con-
trast,28 looking back to the Ordoliberals, takes it that market relations are actually not 
‘natural’ or ‘spontaneous.’ Continuing neoliberal rhetoric enjoining the ‘small state’ and 
‘deregulation’ aside, the post-1979 neoliberal forms of governmentality have been highly 
activist.29 Friedrich Hayek himself, one intellectual inspiration of the new forms of liber-
alism, was very clear that the market freedom he enjoins is an “artefact” or a “disci-
pline,” not something that peoples can be expected to naturally develop:  
                                                                                                                                                                           
biological reproduction and economic productivity – could be tallied, charted, comprehended and targeted 
for interventions by governments. Ibid., 146. 
24 Joseph Pugliese, Biometrics: Bodies, Technologies, Biopolitics (2010), 164. 
25 Metric Power, 7–30. 
26 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 [2004] (2008), 101–128; 
cf. for Foucault on neoliberalism more generally Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’: Michel Fou-
cault's Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality,” Economy and Society 30:2 (2001), 
190–207. 
27 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 129–158 (11 February 1979). 
28 From here on we shall use ‘neoliberalism’ to describe the forms of governing that have emerged in the 
first world since 1979, hostile to the previous social liberal or social democratic compromise. 
29 At the least, they needed to legislatively unwind the direct social welfare, service delivery and tripartite 
bargaining measures characteristic of the post-war, Keynesian or social democratic dispensation. But see 
the following for their positive governmental strategies. 
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Man has not developed in freedom. The member of the little band to which he had had 
to stick in order to survive was anything but free. Freedom is an artefact of civilization 
that released man from the trammels of the small group, the momentary moods of 
which even the leader had to obey. Freedom was made possible by the gradual evolu-
tion of the discipline of civilization which is at the same time the discipline of free-
dom.30 
Just so, neoliberalism is best understood not as a project of rolling back the state in order 
to free pre-existing markets. Following Foucault, it is the recalibration of the state and its 
institutions in order to actively foster and universalise forms of marketised, competitive 
behaviour: taking markets, as it were, where markets have never gone before.31 It is as if 
the organised representatives of capital after the 1970s crisis began looking around for 
new, as-yet-un-commodified arenas of social life to enable the continuing extraction and 
realisation of surplus value. Terrestrial geography largely conquered, particularly fol-
lowing 1989, they turned to the remaining enclaves within advanced societies as yet rel-
atively insulated from forms of marketised competition: firstly, the interior of organisa-
tions, still managed according to more traditional, solidary and hierarchical managerial 
structures;32 and secondly, those institutions of the state involved in directly administer-
ing forms of education, health, social welfare and insurance.  
Neoliberalism proceeds through an ongoing political struggle against the previous 
‘social’ measures that had characterised the Johnsonian ‘Great Society’ and comparable 
forms of social democratic governmentality. “Society does not exist,” Margaret Thatcher 
proclaimed. However that may be, for neoliberalism, the social realm of direct state in-
terventions, benefits and insurance – an “economically and socially costly obstacle to the 
economic performance upon which it depends” – must be dismantled.33 Yet, as Burchell 
notes, what is to follow is not a setting free of natural markets in welfare, health, peni-
tentiary or education provision, since no such markets have ever existed. Rather: 
it becomes a question of constructing the legal, institutional and cultural conditions 
that will enable an artificial competitive game of entrepreneurial conduct to be played 
to best effect. For the Chicago economic liberals it is a question of extending a model of 
rational-economic conduct beyond the economy itself, or generalising it as a principle 
limiting and rationalising governmental activity.34  
In particular, neoliberal governmentality sets out to put in place the legal and institu-
tional preconditions which will compel inefficient or an-economic subjects – the unem-
ployed, the unwell, the deviant, or the public sector employee in receipt of a tax-funded 
                                                        
30 Friedrich Hayek, quoted in Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999), 155–
156. 
31 See The Birth of Biopolitics, esp. 129–158 (11 February 1979). 
32 See on the managerialist revolution Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market 
Populism and the End of Economic Democracy (2002). 
33 Graham Burchell, “Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self,” in Foucault and Political Reason, eds. 
Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose (1996), 27. 
34 Ibid. 
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salary – to discipline their own conduct to market efficiency.35 And the publicly-funded 
institutions of the state, including the universities, are in their turn to be reshaped ac-
cording to the same, ‘enterprising’ neoliberal template.36 The implementation of social 
democratic or welfarist governmental measures, across the different sectors, was the 
provenance of publicly employed experts, mostly trained within the tertiary social sci-
ences, applying specialised understandings of health, income, education, criminality and 
social life. From a neoliberal perspective, these ‘elites’ appear as the quasi-feudal propri-
etors of rent-yielding, expert enclosures, insulated from political attempts to challenge 
their discretionary edicts, or healthy economic pressures to optimally perform.37 The 
neoliberal solution, to “breach welfare enclosures,”38 has less involved replacing the old 
with new, more market-friendly experts,39 so much as what can be called a massive 
transfer of the sanctioned authority previously conferred on the disciplinary experts in 
the educational, health, social and welfare sectors onto forms of accounting, economics 
and financial management. The conduct of public sector employees delivering educa-
tion, welfare or medical services will no longer in neoliberal regimes be a privileged 
domain regulated by these professionals themselves on the basis of social trust in their 
intra-professional norms and credentialising. All must instead be subjected to forms of 
budgetary discipline, auditing (the 1990s thus witnessed what has been called an “audit 
explosion”) and accountancy.40 Stuart Burchell et al. thus note how, in the neoliberal 
                                                        
35 The unemployed for instance now become ‘jobseekers.’ They are subject to active reskilling programs, 
new forms of ongoing examination of their work-readiness and the sincerity of their search for work, or 
put to work for the dole. Compelled by threat of sanctions now to choose for themselves from a market of 
private job-service providers (each themselves competing for new unemployed ‘clients’ to place), these 
‘jobseekers’ are effectively forced to govern their own conduct as entrepreneurial investors of their own 
‘human capital’ – or to “enterprise themselves,” in Rose’s felicitous phrase (Nikolas Rose, “Governing ‘Ad-
vanced’ Liberal Democracies,” in Foucault and Political Reason, 57). The cause and responsibility of anyone’s 
failure to be gainfully employed is thus from heretofore to be internalised or ‘privatised.’ No longer the 
possible signal of governmental failure or societal injustice, it is now a mark of the subject’s ‘deviance’ from 
marketised norms (see also on neoliberal governance and marketisation of the unemployed, Mitchell Dean, 
Governmentality, 165–172). They have failed to become successful investors in and of their own ‘human 
capital’ — a notion whose importance, we note, Foucault stresses in his lectures on the genealogy of ne-
oliberalism (The Birth of Biopolitics, 215–237). 
36 Rose, “Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies,” 54. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 55. 
39 Although this measure has also been pursued, in particular, with the creation of privately-funded think-
tanks, as a virtual alternative tertiary sector supportive of neoliberal reforms. In conjunction with the direct 
privatisation of state-owned assets, neoliberal governmentality puts surviving public institutions into arti-
ficially engendered competition with sometimes publicly-subsidised private providers of welfare, health, 
insurance or education, so the market discipline of these quasi-markets can be exercised, and their ‘effi-
ciency dividends’ be harvested. Our focus here is on how these institutions are managed internally, since 
this is where metrics take effect. 
40 For the “audit explosion,” see Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (1997), 2–14; cf. 
“Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal democracies,” 54. 
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period, accounting and auditing measures have become imbricated in almost every as-
pect of politico-social functioning:41 
Accounting data are now used in the derivation and implementation of policies for 
economic stabilization, price and wage control, the regulation of particular industrial 
and commercial sectors and the planning of national economic resources in conditions 
of war and peace and prosperity and depression.42 
As Rose rejoins concerning the specifically epistemic aspect of this audit explosion, in 
comparison to the previous forms of ‘social’ governmentality: 
These [accounting, auditing and financial practices] certainly rely upon a claim to 
truth, but it is one that has a different character from that of the social and human sci-
ences: these ‘grey sciences’, these know-hows of enumeration, calculation, monitoring, 
evaluation, manage to be simultaneously modest and omniscient, limited yet appar-
ently limitless in their application to problems as diverse as the appropriateness of a 
medical procedure and the viability of a university department.43 
Indeed, today’s proliferating metrics, and within the universities, today’s bibliometrics, 
represent in a Foucauldian optic less anything unprecedented than a paradigm instance 
of a neoliberal, managerial technology. In order for an organisation to be audited, and 
the unchecked reign of its rent-seeking experts to be undercut or opened out, it must 
first be auditable. Yet many of the activities carried out in universities, welfare agencies, 
or hospitals look intrinsically qualitative affairs: face-to-face relations with patients, 
pedagogical work, or indeed the production of high-quality research within one or other 
highly-specialised field, closed to all but highly trained experts. What Rose calls “a new 
grid of visibilities” is then required,44 if we are to perform the miracle of reversing Hegel 
and turning the qualitative back into the quantitative, while casting exogenous light up-
on hitherto-closed off, recondite specialisations. And different metrics – whether docu-
menting numbers of calls per hour or patients treated, jobs sought per week or fortnight, 
student satisfaction, papers published, etc. – are there to perform just this miracle. 
Where previously no such possibility existed, metrics promise to document the hard 
numerical truths about the conduct of individuals across any range of activities, while 
leaving these individuals formally ‘free’ to pursue their tasks and enterprise them-
                                                        
41 We refer here to the prescient 1980 study by Stuart Burchell, Colin Clubb, Anthony Hopwood, John 
Hughes and Janin Nahapiet, “The Roles of Accounting in Organizations and Society,” Accounting, Organi-
zations and Society 5:1 (1980), 5–21. The practice of accounting, they already found, could “no longer be 
regarded as a mere collection of techniques for the assessment of individual economic magnitudes,” exact-
ly because it had begun to function “as a cohesive and influential mechanism for economic and social man-
agement” (ibid., 6). Accounting systems and measures, they noted, “are often used to articulate and pro-
mote particular interested positions and values,” at ibid., 17. It is worth noting that these analysts hailed 
from the London Graduate School of Business Studies and Oxford Centre for Management Studies. 
42 Ibid., 6. 
43 “Governing ‘Advanced’ Liberal Democracies,” 54. 
44 Ibid., 54; on bibliometrics as a means of commensurating the qualitatively different, see “Living with the 
H-Index,” 363–364. 
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selves.45 Armed with such metrics, meanwhile, managers and their decision-making pre-
rogatives are liberated from the direct need to attend to or comprehend the on-the-
ground concerns, specialised knowledges and responsibilities of their line workers — a 
thought we will return to in Part 3. They need now only survey the abstract ‘quant-data’ 
which, to echo Marx, ‘manages for them,’ increasingly enabled by the monitoring and 
metrical affordances of digital and web-based technologies.46 All the while, employees 
are brought through periodic performance assessments and attendant discourses to sub-
jectivise these metrics as the numbers that ‘count,’ over and above whatever first-order 
expertise they have been trained to exercise. 
On the one hand, if we now turn specifically towards bibliometrics and the neoliberal 
governance of tertiary education, it could be said that there is nothing new here: educa-
tion and forms of accounting have long been inextricably linked. Indeed, Hoskin and 
Macve have shown this longstanding link in their historical analysis of accounting prac-
tices from antiquity onwards – including the influence of alphanumerics, and of ‘sec-
ondary’ forms of writing such as listings, ledgers and accounts: “[W]ith the invention of 
the academic mark and its behavioural counterpart, the merit-demerit system,” different 
forms of examination and the numerical ranking of students have long been an essential 
component of the Western university.47 On the other hand, what bibliometrics now 
promise to enable, with all the seeming authority of quantitative measurements, is 
something genuinely novel, and specific to the neoliberal dispensation. This is an ongo-
ing quantitative regimen of examination and ranking, but of the education professionals – 
insofar as these professionals are also now expected to be, as well as teachers, profes-
sional researchers publishing online, citable journal articles in the sanctioned profes-
sional format, between 4–12,000 words, plus or minus attendant notes.48 One need only 
scan electronically, count and compare the citations different people, papers, journals, 
                                                        
45 As with the enterprising of the unemployed, governance in current ‘developed’ regimes prompts and 
requires the ‘free’ buy-in of modern citizens, emphasising their “participation, accountability, transparen-
cy, and human rights as basic elements in the management of society” (“Governance, Security and Tech-
nology,” 113). 
46 Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, Hughes and Nahapiet, “The Roles of Accounting,” 17: “The powerful are 
helped to observe the less powerful, but not vice versa, as a rather particular mode of surveillance is estab-
lished.” This is a comparable asymmetry as that governing the harvesting of biometrics, as above. 
47 Keith W. Hoskin and Richard H. Macve, “Accounting and the Examination: A Genealogy of Disciplinary 
Power,” Accounting Organizations and Society 11:2 (1986), 129. 
48 Let us flag here the evident danger which other authors have noted (see note 6 above): by singling out 
only what is countable about given processes or activities, neoliberal “metric power” inevitably abstracts 
from a good deal of what makes each distinctly what it is or was – like the proverbial man who will only 
look for his lost keys under the lamp, since that is the only place in the room where he can see. By seeking to 
apply such blunt measures, based on a series of assumptions formal enough to accommodate the metrical 
counting, rating and ranking of highly diverse activities, metrics introduce superficial numerical goals that 
actively then distort what they were ostensibly only concerned to measure, as academics and institutions 
reshape behaviour to meet exogenous requirements (what Power’s The Audit Society, esp. 96–104, calls 
“rituals of verification” or “inspection,” in his discussion of academic auditing since the 1990s). But this 
form of critique cannot be pursued further here. 
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departments or entire institutions receive – the seemingly most innocuous or marginal 
features of scholarly labour.49 
Part 2: From the Bible to Bibliometrics, the Genealogy of Notes 
Yet how, then, are we to understand this specific form of bibliometrics as a neoliberal 
technology specifically aimed at governing forms of academic research, that specifically 
proposes to register and count the number of citations which given written texts, and 
thereby their human creators, receive over time? In order to address this question, we 
need to understand how this noting technology stands in relation to a different genealo-
gy: that of previous forms of documentation and note-taking in the Western heritage. 
We will see then that the political functionality we have already glimpsed for bibliomet-
rics in Part 1, and which we will duly analyse more closely in Part 3, is not entirely un-
precedented. It carries forwards and transforms a much older genealogy tracing the 
surprisingly close but longstanding links between forms of Western note-taking and 
documentation, and forms of political subjectivation and control. 
The texts that people write, and indeed the things that they have deemed worthy of 
noting down, have of course changed profoundly over time. These written artefacts 
have nevertheless always reflected, and in turn shaped the subjects who recorded or 
read them, and their specific intellectual, political and wider cultural contexts. In two 
invaluable articles,50 Roger J. Connors has thus argued that, in order to understand the 
different forms of Western note-taking up to the present, we need to keep these different 
cultural and rhetorical dimensions always in view: 
The gradual formalization of written citation systems should not…blind us to their es-
sentially rhetorical nature. Every formal structure implies a universe of meanings. 
Every formal structure declares allegiances and counter-allegiances. Every formal 
structure suggests the ethical and pathetic as well as the logical nature of a discourse 
[i.e. Aristotle’s three means of persuasion]. The seemingly ‘transparent’ structures 
                                                        
49 The rise of social media has also begun to ‘count,’ in the dissemination and reception of academic publi-
cations, in ways which fall outside of the purview of our analysis here. Some scholars and institutions now 
use platforms such as Twitter, Google+ and Facebook to “enhance and extend the impact of their articles 
and books,” as well as using them as another means of rating and ranking scholarly activities (Lisa Black-
man, “Social Media and the Politics of Small Data: Post-Publication Peer Review and Academic Value,” 
Theory, Culture & Society 33:4 (2016), 3–4). Blackman notes that “altmetrics” is presently emerging as a new, 
would-be hegemonic auditing standard “in this space,” involving the process of “post-publication peer 
review,” or “tracking publication afterlives” online—in terms of readers, tweets, shares, etc. She flags is-
sues of scientific and scholarly integrity, the legal ambiguity of publishing rights, and the lengths (and 
excesses) of self-promotion thereby raised or solicited: “co-produced and entangled with relations of status, 
prestige, hierarchy and worth” in an increasingly overcrowded, web-enabled status marketplace (ibid., 6, 
11). 
50 Robert J. Connors, “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I: The Development of Annotation Structures 
from the Renaissance to 1900,” Rhetoric Review 17:1 (Autumn 1998), 6–48; and Robert J. Connors, “The 
Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part II: Competing Epistemic Values,” Rhetoric Review 17:2 (Spring 1999), 219–
245. We will be drawing closely on these two invaluable articles in the analysis that follows. 
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used in formal citation systems have always been as much products and reflections of 
social and rhetorical realities as all other elements of discourse.51 
At least five axes present themselves in such a rhetorical purview which we can use to 
analytically delineate the specificity of bibliometrics as a contemporary form of notation. 
Per Figure 2, these axes single out the ways that notation of different kinds are always: 
firstly, made by some particular subject (the who); secondly, directed at someone, 
whether oneself or others (the whom); thirdly, about some particular ‘what’ or subject 
deemed worthy of recording; fourthly, availing themselves of specific means – material 
or technological, as well as logical or rhetorical; and finally, recorded or published with 
some ‘why’ or end in mind (whether ethical, political, pious, playful or pedagogical). 
 
Figure 2: Pre-Bibliometric Types of Western Note-Taking (Who, Whom, What, How, Why) 
 
Today’s bibliometrics are the heirs of three basic, prior kinds of note-taking from the 
classical, Judaeo-Christian and modern legacies (discursive-interpretative notes, aids to 
memory, and citational notes), and what can be identified as four lineages of such docu-
mentation.52 
The first lineage of notes that emerges in the Western heritage are discursive-
interpretative in kind. Twenty-four hundred years old, they take the form of marginal 
notes containing Midrash of the Torah and homiletic texts, added by hand by the He-
brew scribes transcribing the sacred texts.53 The annotation form developed by these 
scribes consisted of a widely spaced original text, centrally placed and written in large 
letters, surrounded by smaller glossing text. In 1481, following the advent of printing, 
the first marginal annotations of this type appeared in print in a Venetian edition of 
                                                        
51 Connors, “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I,” 6–7. 
52 Following Connors and Hauptman, and with a view to our specific concerns, we exclude here forms of 
directly administrative note-taking or inventorying, reaching back to some of the earliest forms of writing. 
53 Hauptman, Documentation, 14–15; “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I,” 7–8. 
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Horace with marginal commentaries by Acro and Porphyry (compare the Virgil text in 
Figure 3).54  
Here as elsewhere throughout the genealogy of notational practices, a material cause 
(or how) underwrote the form these ‘marginalia’ took on. Their inclusion on the same 
pages as the source text served to save paper, and hence economise on costs. Neverthe-
less, this material form – with the original text as it were walled in on all four sides by 
interpretive additions – also eloquently betrays the telos or why of these discursive-
interpretative notes.  
 
Figure 3: Humanist, Marginal Notes in a 1600 Edition of Virgil 
As with the Hebrew Midrash, many of the earliest annotated texts in Christian Europe 
were editions of the Bible: a text of the highest religious and political significance. The 
goal of these notes, added to the source text with the imprimatur of sanctified Church 
authorities (the who), was to effectively hem in or control the interpretation of Holy Writ 
by its lay readers (the whom). Thus, for instance, the 13th century Glossa Ordinaria encir-
cled biblical verses with authorised marginal and interlinear glosses from theologians 
and teachers like Walafrid Strabo and Peter Lombard.55 The Reformation’s appeal to sola 
scriptura called for new Bibles in the vernacular languages to enable the laity to read for 
themselves, freed from the mediations of the Papal Church. Nevertheless, far from re-
moving marginal glossa, the Reformation instead gave rise to Bibles with Protestant 
“counter-glossa,” evincing the same intentionality of hermeneutic control as their foes. 
Thus, the Coverdale Bible sponsored by Henry VIII (1535: Figure 4) inserted into the 
                                                        
54 “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part I,” 8–9. 
55 Ibid., 15. 
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margins of biblical verses a series of small pointing hands that, far from mere curios, 
served to indicate to the laity those passages which allowed for no ‘private interpreta-
tion,’ belonging hermeneutically to the Church of England.56 
 
 
Figure 4: Coverdale Bible, with ‘Pointers’ to which Sayings are Off Hermeneutic Limits 
With 1582 and the Rheims Bible (Figure 5 below), we arrive at a landmark text and date 
in the genealogy of Western notation: the birth both of endnotes, and also of the specifi-
cally citational notes which would assume such predominance in the professional aca-
demic writing of the 19th and 20th centuries.57 Endnotes, plus marginalia, are intro-
duced for the first time at the end of biblical chapters in this Catholic text.  
 
                                                        
56 Ibid., 18–19. 
57 Ibid., 19–23. 
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Figure 5: Page from the 1582 Rheims Bible, the Origin of Western Citational Notes 
From the technical point of view, these endnotes served to reduce the clutter of pages 
that had been introduced by earlier, text-encircling marginal notes. Nevertheless, the 
same politics of annotation, one of hermeneutic control over the whom (lay readers), re-
mained determinative. The Rheims Bible thus features discursive, interpretative notes 
appealing again to the authority of revered Catholic theologians from Ambrose to Au-
gustine. Protestants are by contrast named as “the adversaries” or “hereticks,” and we 
are served notice that these endnotes are expressly there to prevent readers following 
“their private judgement or the arrogant spirit of Sectaries.”58 It is in fact as servants of 
just this confessional-political mission that the Rheims Bible also featured the West’s 
first citational notes.59 In the struggle against heresy, nothing less precise would any 
longer do: the good but easily-misled Catholic readers must from now on be directed to 
duly-sanctioned authorities by titles, editions, chapters and verses, leaving no documen-
tary detail to choice (hairêsis) or chance. 
The West’s second, competing lineage of note-taking was approached by Michel Fou-
cault in his last works on the care of the self in classical antiquity under the heading of 
“Self Writing.”60 As Foucault’s title suggests, here a quite different political or rather 
ethical intentionality is in play, compared to that underlying the biblical genesis of to-
day’s discursive and citational notes. The subject making the notes here (the who) is also 
their principal or sole intended addressee (the whom). Their content (the what) may come 
from samples of others’ read or heard discourses, or from working over deeply-held 
philosophical or religious convictions. Yet one’s notes, when one is engaged in produc-
ing such “hypomnēmata” (aids to memory) need never be read by others: a fate that Mar-
                                                        
58 Ibid., 21. 
59 Ibid., 21–23. 
60 Michel Foucault, “Self Writing” [1994], in Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth: The Essential Works of Michel Fou-
cault, 1954–1984, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (1997), 207–224; see also on this ancient practice, Pierre Hadot, 
The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius [1992] (1998). 
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cus Aurelius seems clearly to have intended for what we know as his Meditations. Ethical 
benefit is instead sought from the very act of recording different thoughts or sayings, 
and of having these written aids-to-memory “at hand” to shape one’s life and choices at 
need.61 Thus, the Roman Stoic Epictetus enjoins his pupils, in the text that Arrian, his 
pupil, recorded as the opening of the Discourses: “let these thoughts be at your command 
[prokheiron] by night and day: write them, read them, talk of them, to yourself and to 
your neighbour...”62  
The lineage of “commonplace notebooks” belonging to the rhetorical tradition also 
falls squarely within this second, Western notational legacy. Here, while author and ad-
dressee, who and whom, are again the same individual, the why was less about reforming 
a person’s entire conduct, as with the Stoic and Christian hypomnēmata, so much as train-
ing the subject in the ability to recollect and elegantly express opinions about ‘common’ 
civil, political, ethical, or even natural and religious subjects. One would for instance 
enter elegant sentences or striking examples under the headings of the four cardinal vir-
tues and the different vices.63 As Ann Moss’ Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structur-
ing of Renaissance Thought highlights, the locus classicus informing the continuing lineage 
of commonplacing into the early modern period comes from Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius. 
In the 84th letter, Seneca writes to his student that, in order to read productively: 
We should imitate bees and we should keep in separate compartments whatever we 
have collected from our diverse reading, for things conserved separately keep better. 
Then, diligently applying all the resources of our native talent, we should mingle all 
the various nectars we have tasted, and turn them into a single sweet substance, in 
such a way that, even if it is apparent where it originated, it appears quite different 
from what it was in its original state.64 
It is just such a practice, as Moss and others have shown, that forms the basis of the ex-
ample- and sententia-thick essays of the early modern period: notably those of Michel de 
Montaigne and Francis Bacon.65 Such commonplacing was a preoccupation of early 
modern educational thinkers like Erasmus. Here, it was conceived as the means not 
simply to supplement memory but also to cultivate abundance (copia) and elegance of 
written and spoken language – as well as thereby, of course, to signal the subject’s be-
longing to a classically and biblically educated elite, as later the use of citational notes 
will signal professional belonging.66 The philosopher Francis Bacon’s epistolary ex-
                                                        
61 Foucault, “Self Writing,” 220–221. 
62 Epictetus, quoted in ibid., 209. As Foucault shows, this practice of self-writing survived antiquity and 
migrated into the monastic tradition. The Vita Antonii of Athanasius hence enjoins his charges, noting the 
Christian inflection, to: “[l]et this observation be a safeguard against sinning: let us each note and write 
down our actions and impulses of the soul as though we were to report them to each other….” (ibid., 207). 
63 See esp. Ann Moss, “Ancient and Medieval Places,” chap. 1 in Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structur-
ing of Renaissance Thought (1995). 
64 Seneca, Letters to Lucilius, 84, 5–6, cited at Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books, 11–12. 
65 See esp. William E. Engel, “Aphorism, Anecdote, and Anamnesis in Montaigne and Bacon,” Montaigne 
Studies 1:1 (1989), 158–176. 
66 On Erasmus and commonplacing, see Printed Commonplace-Books, 102–115. 
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change with the poet Fulke Greville, for instance, is given over to his proffering the 
younger man advice on note-taking at the beginning of his university career;67 a subject 
central also in his “A Letter and Discourse to Sir Henry Savile Touching Helps for the 
Intellectual Powers” and his “Second Letter to the Earl of Rutland.”68 
What we might term a third ‘counter-lineage’ of occidental note-writing emerges 
nearly contemporaneously with the declining centrality both of the Bible within lettered 
European culture, and of the Renaissance practices of commonplacing. This tradition 
looks back in particular to Pierre Bayle, the sceptical dialectician whose Historical and 
Critical Dictionary, today little read, was amongst the most influential works of the 18th 
century Enlightenment.69 Many of the pages of this remarkable Dictionary feature only a 
small amount of text on the alphabetised entries at the top of the folio columns. These 
scant entries are however accompanied by a far greater volume of discursive, footnoted 
“Remarks” (indicated by capital letters) beneath. For example, the entry on “Virgil” 
(compare Figure 6) has only 44 lines of text, plus some 1044 lines of discursive footnotes. 
What makes the Baylean notes so singular, however, is less their quantity than their 
novel, subversive intentionality. If, in the forms of self-writing we have seen, it is a mat-
ter of drawing notes from other texts so the author can form themselves; and if, within 
the midrashic-biblical tradition, authorities had inserted interpretative notes as means to 
police authorised meaning, with Bayle the political functionality of the discursive note is 
inverted. Here, it becomes a means to evade theologico-political censorship and expand 
the knowledges and subjects available for readers’ consideration. Bayle’s most famous 
entry “David” thus involves a brief, pious exposition of the biblical stories concerning 
the Old Testament king. Bayle’s notes, by contrast, criticise the plausibility of biblical 
claims: “it is somewhat strange that Saul did not know David, the day he slew Goli-
ath…since that young man had played several times on the musical instruments for 
him….”70  
 
                                                        
67 Francis Bacon, “Advice to Fulke Greville on his Studies,” in Francis Bacon: The Major Works, ed. Brian 
Vickers (2002), 102–106. 
68 Francis Bacon, “A Letter and Discourse to Sir Henry Savile Touching Helps for the Intellectual Powers” 
and “Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his Travels” in ibid., 114–119, 69–80. Bacon himself seems to have at 
one point kept 28 commonplace books: “in one he jotted down any idea as it occurred to him, in another he 
copied as many of these reflections as time had shown to have some value, in a third he entered excerpts 
from his readings without order, and in a fourth excerpts and original ideas were arranged under heads 
[i.e. commonplaces].” Jacob Zeitlin “Commonplaces in Elizabethan Life and Letters,” The Journal of English 
and Germanic Philology 19:1 (January 1920), 64. 
69 On Bayle, specifically his noting practices, see Documentation, 44–48; Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A 
Curious History (1997), 191–215; Chuck Zerby, The Devil’s Details: A History of Footnotes (2002), 66–78. 
70 Pierre Bayle, “David” [1697], in Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, ed. Richard H. Popkin (1991), 
49, “C.” On this entry and its subversive notes, with the political context, see Walter Rex, “Pierre Bayle: The 
Theology and Politics of the Article on David: Part I,” Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance 24:1 (1962), 
168–189. 
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Figure 6: A Page from Bayle, the ‘Devil’ being in the Detailed, Sprawling Notes 
They challenge the competence of biblical author/s:  
 
if such a narrative as this should have been found in Thucydides…all the critics would 
unanimously conclude that the transcribers had transposed the pages, forgot some-
thing in one place, repeated something in another, or inserted some preposterous ad-
ditions in the author’s name.71  
 
Bayle also questions the exemplary credentials of the biblical king himself, painting him 
instead as a lecher and a brigand: “to tell the truth, his conduct was very bad.”72 In the 
excitable words of one recent commentator, Bayle’s notes “buzz with every pornograph-
ic interpretation of a biblical passage and every sexual anecdote about a philosopher or a 
scholar.”73 
With the advent of the modern university in the first decades of the 19th century, a 
fourth notational lineage – the one in which academic professionals still largely operate 
today – was set to emerge. Citational notes, from this point onwards, took on both a new 
                                                        
71 Bayle, “David,” 49, “C.” 
72 Ibid., 51, “D.” 
73 At Zerby, The Devil’s Details, 71. We note also that Bayle laces his long notes with subversive cross-
references, leading the reader from notes to one entry to notes in another, and sometimes into contradicto-
ry termini. Likewise, in the Encyclopedia of Diderot and D’Alembert, which hymns Bayle, in a dedicated 
entry, Bayle’s admirers borrow something of his form, as well as content. The entry “God,” for instance, 
which is pious and conventional, closes with a link to “Demonstration,” in which the epistemic bases for 
believing in the miracles and stories at the origin of revealed Christianity are scrupulously undermined. 
See Will Durant and Ariel Durant, The Age of Voltaire (1968), 644. 
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prominence and a different scholarly why to those of prior practices of note-taking, 
whether sacred or sacrilegious. From instruments of churchly hermeneutic control or the 
means to forms of self-cultivation, notes now became shibboleths of a new community 
of note-takers and readers: that of secularised, professional scholars. Addressed by as-
pirant or established scholars (the who) to other professionals (the whom), notes in later 
modern academic writings “often sounded and looked like what they were: the secret 
handshake known only to members of the secret society, filled with the latinate citation 
jargon that had grown up since the Renaissance” (loc. cit., ibid., etc.).74 Their presence at 
the foot of pages, or trailing from the ends of chapters or learned monographs serves on 
the one hand to certify – a powerful means of persuasion – that the particular 
knowledge-claims proffered by the text are duly certified and traceable back to recog-
nised proof texts or established authorities.75 On the other hand, they announce that 
their creator is no mere philosophe, litterateur, amateur or ‘man of letters,’ but a literate 
member of a select, credentialed professional status group.76 
The year 1892, when the US Geological Survey published its Suggestions for the Prepa-
ration of Manuscripts, then marks, after 1582, a further ‘red letter date’ in the genealogy of 
today’s bibliometrical dispensation.77 These Suggestions are the first published manual 
given over to how academic professionals should formally make citational references. 
By 1906, the first Chicago Manual of Style had appeared, featuring four pages of “Hints to 
Authors and Editors” of learned journals, with three pages devoted to “Footnotes.”78 
Different humanistic or scientific disciplines, indeed different journals within given 
subject fields, have negotiated differently the ensuing transition to the later modern cita-
tional dispensation. Generally speaking, the sciences have opted for the in-text Harvard 
referencing style. This notation sacrifices readability, where long lists of authors and 
dates end sentences, but efficiently marks dates of publication of research. As Connors 
notes, it thus well encapsulates and communicates the ethos of these cumulative, quick-
ly-evolving research fields.79 Humanities outlets, by contrast, have mostly held on to 
foot- or endnotes, both to save the readability of the main text, and to keep open the 
possibility of discursive-interpretative notes: a last umbilical tying the later modern 
“disciplinary capture” of knowledge80 back to classical philology and biblical hermeneu-
tics. ‘In-between’ disciplines in the social sciences, notably psychology, have experi-
enced a ‘science envy’ which their evolving citational conventions, amongst other mark-
ers, allows us to trace. Whereas the first “List of References” in a psychological journal 
appeared in 1918, and many outlets continued to allow footnote citations until around 
                                                        
74 Connors, “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part 2,” 222. 
75 See Grafton, The Footnote, 22–23. 
76 See on this point “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part 1,” 40–43. 
77 Ibid., 43. 
78 Ibid., 43–45. 
79 “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part 2,” 222–224. 
80 See Robert Frodeman and Adam Briggle, Socrates Tenured: The Institutions of 21st-Century Philosophy (2016), 
73–75. 
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1950, after this time, psychological journals have opted for Harvard, with all its scientis-
tic connotations.81 
The bibliometrics of the first decades of the 21st century, evidently, institute a new 
turn of the screw, predicated upon this later modern, citational, professionalising legacy 
– as well as the much longer-standing ties between discursive and citational notation 
and forms of political control. It is to the specific parameters of this new notational and 
governmental technology, and the forms of intellectual subjectivity it supposes and calls 
into being82, that we turn now. 
Part 3: Bibliometrics Reframed 
As a form of notation that presupposes pre-existing professional, disciplinary practices 
of citational referencing, bibliometrics are presented by their advocates as being as ‘apo-
litical’ as these citational notes themselves. Indeed, they are celebrated as, at last, proffer-
ing ‘scientific’ mathematical measures to adjudicate research quality more reliably than 
the in-house peer reviewing which they at once presuppose and increasingly supplant. 
All this new form of notation after all proposes is that, since we now can, we also should 
tally the references to the proper names of authors and article titles in ‘donor’ articles, 
leaving all of the established academic practices of peer review and publication ostensi-
bly in place as before. 
Nevertheless, if we look at bibliometrics now in the comparative light cast by our ge-
nealogy of the prior forms of notation in Part 2, we see that citation counting is predicat-
ed on an unprecedented three-fold abstraction in the history of Western notation. This 
treble abstraction both bespeaks and renders invisible new forms of power and control, 
more subtle and indirect but no less real than those characterising the biblical glossa and 
the theologico-political censorship still facing figures like Bayle and his admirers during 
the Age of Enlightenment. First, these metrics abstract from any and all content being 
conveyed in the ‘donor text/s’ about the cited text/s. It is enough that the ‘recipient’ text is 
cited in a ‘donor’ journal, whether critically, perfunctorily or in praise – so long as that 
journal’s articles themselves are registered and counted by the relevant bibliometric in-
dex. Secondly, bibliometrics thus abstract completely from any direct engagement with 
or evaluation of the specific claims, epistemic virtues or contents of the referenced article 
itself. Each article now ‘gets its significance back from the others,’ as it were – for the 
notes that will attest to its merit and status are not its own. Thirdly, bibliometric citation 
counting therefore abstracts almost completely from any intentionality of either authors 
or readers of the donor or recipient articles. Whereas marginalia grew out of scribal 
transcription, and foot- and endnotes from the powers of the printing press, bibliomet-
rics presupposes a new, this time automated, asubjective material medium: that of the internet. 
Uniquely in the history of notation, however, its medium or how, moreover, is also as it 
                                                        
81 “The Rhetoric of Citation Systems, Part 2,” 228–232. 
82 What Hall calls the “academic subjectivation machine,” in Gary Hall, “#Mysubjectivation,” New For-
mations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 79 (2013), 89–92. 
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were now the who making the notes: automatically and constantly, using algorithmic 
programming, while the human scholars whose labours they quantify sleep or write.83 
Alongside this new who, bibliometrics introduce a new principal whom into the histo-
ry of noting. As we know from Part 1, this whom is none other than the neoliberal uni-
versity manager.84 In place of the potentially misguided biblical laity, at permanent risk 
of being led astray; or of the note-taking subject wrestling with his passions or cultivat-
ing copia eloquentia; or, indeed, even of the humble scholar needing to be directed by due 
citations to the source texts appealed to by his/her colleagues – in place of all these pre-
bibliometric notational addressees comes this new figure who, unlike any of his prede-
cessors, need not understand (or potentially misunderstand) the first-order content 
across the range of disciplines that fall under his operational sway; and who need in-
deed open no text at all, as we have just seen, from the practitioners in these disciplines. 
They need instead only log in to one or other web-based platform that will proffer, al-
most instantaneously, the rank orderings of thousands of individuals and articles, and 
hundreds of journals. These rankings, to be sure, draw upon and reframe the collective 
labour of academics engaged in thousands of hours of peer reviewing. But their legibil-
ity, and their claim to quantitative authority, call upon no direct scholarly expertise of 
this managerial addressee’s own – who indeed ‘gets more for less,’ the ultimate promise 
of neoliberal ‘governing at a distance.’ Taken up now by global university ranking agen-
cies, as we opened by stressing, these novel notational technologies are thus rapidly be-
coming a reified universal, increasingly unchallenged tool of university governance, 
individual performance management, and finally academics’ own sense of what it is that 
they are and do.85  
For we also saw in Part 1 that the technologies of neoliberal governmentality indeed 
work by inculcating new understandings of their own values, actions and aims into the 
governed subjects themselves. It is a matter of prompting these subjects to govern and 
market themselves as entrepreneurial investors of their own “human capital.”86 The 
                                                        
83 This is also why, until such time as all printed books are uploaded online, only electronic journals, as 
against monographs or collections can count/be counted by several of the major bibliometric platforms. 
84 And via managers, the universities themselves. Weingart and Maasen (“Elite Through Rankings,” 76) 
show for instance how, in Germany, the artificial category of the ‘elite’ university is propped up based on 
spurious ranking metrics. And much like the way in which academics are expected to regulate themselves 
within the terms of these arrangements, universities as “institutional selves” through the same “accounting 
and other managerial procedures” become “capable of steering themselves and others in most flexible 
ways, thereby turning themselves into what we call enterprising universities.” See also “The Institutionaliza-
tion of Rankings,” 10. 
85 Compare “Living with the H-Index,” 361–362. 
86 As we commented in note 35 above, in his 14 March 1979 lecture at the Collège de France, Foucault entered 
into a discussion of the notion of ‘human capital,’ considered both, along the line of classical economic 
analyses, as “the extension of economic analysis into a previously unexplored domain”; as well as, from the 
opposite angle, the extension of the idea of the human into the domain of the economic (“the possibility of 
giving a strictly economic interpretation of a whole domain previously thought to be non-economic”). 
Foucault notes a shift, within post-war liberal economic theories, from a concentration on “things or pro-
cesses” to the “internal rationality” of forms of human behaviour, focused on the question of why people 
decide “to allot given scarce resources to this end rather than another.” When economists start to define 
SHARPE AND TURNER 
Foucault Studies, No. 25, 146-173. 
   
168 
fundamental, as it were ‘proto-managerial’ promise of the panopticon thus remains op-
erative: one in which the issue of whether anyone actually watches surveilled subjects in 
the panopticon is less important than the way that the observed or managed subjects are 
trained to observe and ‘manage’ themselves.87 And this, precisely, seems to us to be the most 
important and potentially insidious register of bibliometrical technologies, as well as 
that which a Foucauldian approach in particular allows us to bring to needed critical 
visibility.88 To be sure, we no longer have to deal in bibliometrics with the direct priestly 
or political censorship which we have seen governed how and which discursive and 
citational notes were penned and published until the 18th century. Like biopower itself, 
bibliometrics enunciate no direct injunctions or prohibitions. Rather, through their sheer 
proliferation, and through the mouths and judgements of their managerial addressees, 
they promote within academics themselves (their secondary, ultimate whom) new con-
ceptions and measures of ‘success’ profoundly distant from any of the traditional or 
modern-postcritical, endogenous understandings of intellectual labour.  
In one sense, therefore, it can be accurately said that the bibliometrics redouble, alt-
hough not reverse, the economy of visibility at work in the Benthamite panopticon. For 
what matters here is not simply that the subjects themselves, or their ‘outputs,’ are visi-
ble and counted – although this very much also remains the case. To exert their full sub-
jectivising effects, the bibliometrical counts and rankings must also themselves become in-
creasingly visible to citational academic subjects. They must be there, as they increasingly 
are, as soon as an academic logs in to a university homepage via their personalised 
‘dashboards’; as soon as they visit a site like academia.edu, increasingly important in 
fostering research connections and keeping up with their field; or indeed as soon as 
they, pursuing their labours, so much as open the websites of journals which they must 
read if they are to contribute to scholarship (see Figure 7). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
capital in terms of the individual’s ‘income streams’ and ‘wages,’ in the form of “that which makes a future 
income possible, this income being a wage,” then one sees that “it is a capital which in practical terms is 
inseparable from the person who possesses it.” Hence this form of capital is “the set of investments we 
have made at the level of man himself” and humans begin to be considered, in a new way, as calculable 
present and prospective earnings streams that one can bank upon and insure against. Marx’s alienated 
worker of the 19th century thus became in the latter half of the 20th century “an enterprise for himself” and 
as such we see “[a]n economy made up of enterprise-units, a society made up of enterprise-units” (The 
Birth of Biopolitics, 215–237). 
87 We refer here of course to the classic analysis of the panopticon in Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 199–
207. 
88 See “Living with the H-Index,” 364. 
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Figure 7: Metric Creep: Views, Crossref Citations, Citation Updates on a Journal Homepage 
For it is by way of this visibility, as well as in their growing ubiquity in the discourse of 
managers and colleagues, that metrical assessments of their fields are internalised by 
academics, reshaping their sense of what is worth thinking, writing, reading, or doing. 
Let us say then, looking back to Part 2, that these ‘hyper-visibilised’ bibliometrics also 
function as in effect ‘para-hypomnêmata.’ They are reminders to selves, recalling them to 
what counts, as in the Stoic or Christian traditions of self-writing. But the who, as we 
have seen, is not the noting subject, but the web-based affordances without which they 
increasingly cannot do their work, which now have taken on the role of automatically 
reminding them, several times every day, of where they sit in the global research rank-
ing order; that there is such an order, increasingly sanctioned by universities and journals 
themselves; and that everything they write will be, has been, and is being constantly 
rated in these terms. 
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Figure 8: Bibliometric versus Citational Noting (Who, Whom, What, How, Why) 
The “bibliometric academic subject,” as we might call someone who has wholly internal-
ised the new bibliometrical dispensation, would then be a profoundly new kind of intel-
lectual subject, relative to their predecessors in the multifarious histories of the life of the 
mind. They would be a figure who pre-eminently writes; who reads so they can write 
and must write so they can survive in the increasingly competitive markets for tenured 
or fixed-term academic work.89 They would be someone who will write only for, and 
increasingly only read in certain bibliometrically ordained journals – which will attract 
massive amounts of traffic, and need to institute increasingly prohibitive rates of ac-
ceptance and rejection. They would be someone who, independent of what they write 
upon – from progressive politics to the human genome – will have internalised the no-
tion that ‘good’ or ‘rigorous’ or ‘professional’ or ‘serious’ work is always ‘impact-ful’ 
work: and that this ‘impact’ is authoritatively measured by the bibliometrical rankings 
which they need only go online to recall to mind. They would be someone who will al-
ways be aware of their status as a ranked competitor with their contemporaries. They 
may increasingly indeed have ready to hand (prokheiron) not only their own h-, i- and 
sundry citational indexes, but those of potential rivals for positions, promotions, grants 
or honours. They will above all be a subject acutely dependent for their sense of profes-
sional (and thus wider) status on the opinions and citations of others. This citational 
value, delivered back to them through the oracular portals of increasingly traffic-light-
coded (red, orange, and green) journal and personal ranking sites, will tell them suffi-
ciently the truth about their status, what is to be done and what to be ignored.  
The aim of this essay in the history of the present has been only to understand the ge-
nealogical lineages and comparative singularities of contemporary bibliometrics as a 
notational means for assessing academic research. We have tried also to render visible 
                                                        
89 On the way this dispensation plays upon, indeed commodifies older models of authorship and “original-
ity,” see Hall, “#Mysubjectivation,” esp. 96–97. 
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the wider cultural and political dimensions and stakes of this proliferating phenomenon. 
Readers will form their own opinions concerning the bibliometric avatar depicted in the 
previous paragraph, a counter-factual projection with heuristic intent more than an ac-
tual portrait. Certainly, our analysis shows how the burgeoning reign of bibliometrics is 
pushing contemporary academia far away from Pierre Bayle – “the Mozart of the foot-
note”90 – and his republic of letters, let alone Bayle’s reworking of discursive and cita-
tional notes into a sprawling arsenal to provoke his contemporaries to challenge authori-
ty and think anew. 
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